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Abstract:  This paper re-examines the Romer [1990] “knowledge driven” endogenous growth model in an open 
economy setting. As an alternative to Rivera-Batiz and Romer [1991], we consider trade between two absolutely 
identical countries that are characterized by imperfect competition in one of the trade goods. Contrary to Rivera-
Batiz and Romer [1991], we find that trade in goods without trade in ideas is detrimental to long run growth while 
trade in goods in conjunction with trade in ideas is good for long run growth.  We further demonstrate that the pro-
competitive gains from trade in goods is analogous to the analysis of imperfect competition by standard international 
trade theory. 
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I.  Introduction 
Endogenous growth theory has enjoyed enormous 
attention over the last several years.   New growth 
theory, as it is sometimes referred, considers 
technological change, growth, and welfare in the 
context of a neoclassical representative agent model.  
Amongst the abundant literature, papers that 
explicitly consider the nature of technological change 
include Romer [1990] with “knowledge driven 
growth”, Grossman and Helpman [1991] with 
“quality ladders,” and Aghion and Howitt [1992] 
with “creative destruction.”  Each of these papers has 
received wide acclaim to the effect that they now 
rank among the seminal works in the New Growth 
Theory literature.  Consequently, these papers 
provide the frameworks for subsequent research 
extensions. 
 
One such extension is the paper by Rivera-Batiz and 
Romer [1991]. They attempt to analyse the Romer 
[1990] model in an open economy setting.  Their 
results are now part of the standard fare of many 
graduate macroeconomics courses and the textbooks 
that they use.1 
 
This paper re-examines the Romer [1990] 
“knowledge driven” endogenous growth model in an 
open economy setting.  We present an alternative 
specification to that which is found Rivera-Batiz and 
Romer [1991].  They consider two countries that are 
identical only up until the point in which trade opens, 
after which, by assumption they cease to be identical.  
They assume that once open, each country may 
produce unique intermediate goods, avoid 
redundancy, and thereby earn monopoly rents 
worldwide.  Therefore, each firm may exploit its 
monopoly across both countries until a competitor, 
who must necessarily be foreign, comes along with a 
better intermediate good.  As a result, the two 
countries take turns introducing innovations.  
Furthermore, there is no change in output, work 
effort, or growth from autarky to trade because, with 
trade, the intermediate goods producer is effectively 
faced with twice the market for half the time.  They 
conclude that “free trade in goods (without trade in 
ideas)… does not affect log run growth rates” 
[Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991, p.544]. 
 
We assume that the two countries are absolutely 
identical before and after trade.  In autarky, each 
country produces its own version of each new 
innovation. With trade, each country simultaneously 
continues to produce a version of each new 
intermediate good.  The home and foreign versions of 
each new intermediate good are perfect substitutes 
for one another such that pro-competitive gains from 
trade may result. 
 
This paper shows, in the context of the Romer [1990] 
model, that trade in goods without trade in ideas is 
detrimental to long run growth while trade in goods 
in conjunction with trade in ideas is good for long run 
growth.  Furthermore, we demonstrate that the nature 
of trade in goods is analogous to the standard pro-
competitive gains from trade result from the 
international trade literature on imperfect 
competition. 
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The Romer [1990] model considers technological 
change to be a result of existing technology 
combined with human capital.  The greater the stock 
of technology at any given time, the greater is the 
potential for even greater technological advances at 
that time, given some human capital expenditure.  
The representative agent allocates his human capital 
competitively between the final goods sector and 
R&D sector.  Final goods are produced from human 
capital, labour, and a continuum of intermediate 
goods.  Intermediate goods, imperfect substitutes for 
one another, are produced trivially from final goods.   
 
Trade between identical countries under these 
circumstances is intuitively identical to those results 
from imperfect competition in the trade literature.  In 
other words, imperfect competition is an effective 
determinant of trade that results in pro-competitive 
gains.2  The move from autarky to free trade in goods 
effectively changes each intermediate good 
producer’s market structure from monopoly to 
duopoly.  Consistent with standard trade theory, cross 
country competition between rival monopolists 
results in each intermediate firm producing more 
output to sell at a lower price. Although there is no 
actual trade, existence of a rival creates pro-
competitive gains from trade, which implies 
increased production of intermediate goods and a fall 
in its price.   With greater intermediate goods to work 
with, the marginal products of labour and human 
capital both increase in the production of final goods.  
Furthermore, lower monopoly profits today implies 
lower profits tomorrow.  In other words, pro-
competitive gains from trade also implies a lower 
marginal product of research.  The agent responds 
accordingly by devoting more human capital towards 
final production and less toward research.  Since the 
growth rate of technology is a function of the human 
capital devoted to research, trade in goods without 
trade in ideas hurts long run growth.  
 
Once trade in ideas is also allowed, the wealth effect 
of doubling the size of the market for new ideas 
overwhelms the substitution effect from the change in 
the relative price of human capital.  Agents respond 
by devoting more human capital to research relative 
to the case of trade in only goods.  Since the growth 
rate of technology is now a function of the world 
stock of ideas, although the agent still devotes less 
human capital to research relative to autarky, the 
growth rate of technology with trade in ideas is 
higher. 
 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section II 
presents a synopsis of the methodology used by 
Romer [1990].  Section III explains the difference 
between Rivera-Batiz and Romer [1991] and our 
alternative specification.  Section IV discusses the 
amended results.  Section V contains concluding 
remarks. 
 
II.  Summary of Romer [1990] 
The Romer [1990] model considers an infinitely lived 
representative agent who is endowed with labor ( L ) 
and human capital ( H ) and consumes only final 
goods that are competitively produced from labor, 








Y H L x di    

     
  
Technological change ( A ) is the result of human 
capital (HA) and the stock of technology (A). 
(2) 
AA H A  0      
  
The market for human capital is competitive. 
(3) 
A YH H H      
  
Each intermediate producer is a monopolist facing 
with an inverse demand for its variety of input that is 
exactly equal to its marginal product in the 
production of Y. 
(4)  1i Y iP H L x r
           
  
The profit maximizing price and output of the 
representative monopolist is defined as follows. 








   
 




The market for ideas is competitive and therefore 
A A AP MC MR  .  The marginal revenue of a 
new idea is derived from the discounted future profits 
to the R&D firm once it has exploited the monopoly 











    
  
While the firm is still in the R&D phase, it faces a 
competitive market.  Therefore, it is the zero profit 
condition faced by the representative R&D firm that 
determines the wage for human capital devoted to 
R&D.3 
(7) H Aw P A     
  
The wage for human capital devoted to final goods 
(HY) is determined from its marginal product in terms 
of final goods. 
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Y Yw H L Ax
         
  
A competitive human capital market implies that 
H Aw w .  This may be used to solve for the 
optimal allocation of human capital between final 




























   

  
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III. Analysis of Rivera-Batiz and Romer [1991] 
Rivera-Batiz and Romer [1991] consider trade 
between two identical economies as described by 
Romer [1990].    The economies are identical only up 
until trade is opened.4  In so doing, they first consider 
trade in intermediate goods without trade in ideas.  
Regarding the price of a new idea, they state the 
following: 
 
“For the research sector, opening of trade implies that 
the market for any newly designed good is twice as 
large as it was in the absence of trade.  This doubles 
the price of the patents and raises the return to 
investing human capital in research from AP A  to 
2 AP A .” [Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991, p. 543-4] 
 
This statement rests on the assumption that new 
intermediate goods produced in the open economy 
are not redundant.  In Rivera-Batiz and Romer 
[1991], there is no foreign alternative intermediate 
good available to the final goods producer. On the 
other hand, we assume that each country produces its 
own version of each new intermediate good.  The 
return to investing in human capital in research still 
increases by a factor of 2 but in a slightly different 
manner.   
The return to research, wH, is determined from the 
zero profit condition of the individual researcher, 
which does not change. 
 
(13) 0A Aj A Aj jP H A w H       
  
The output of individual R&D firm j equals 
j AjA H A .  Rivera-Batiz and Romer [1991] 
assume that R&D firm j doubles its output of A with 
trade.  This is strictly true only when new innovations 
are not redundant. If each country can produce its 
own version of every new innovation, then firm j 
may still double its output of A, but only as a 
response by firm j to a change in the competitive 
price, PA.  Therefore, consider the model similar to 
that presented by Rivera-Batiz and Romer [1991] 
except that firm j produces output Aj in response to 
price, PA. 
   
The model is specified as follows.  There are two 
absolutely identical countries that may trade in 
intermediate goods but not in ideas.  Final goods 











    
  
Model symmetry implies that A=AF.  Since there is 
no trade in ideas, the change in technology is solely a 
function of domestic stocks of A. 
(15) 
AA H A  0     
  
 
The return on human capital in R&D, wA, is derived 
from the zero profit condition, equation (13), and the 
return on human capital in final goods production, 
wY, is derived from its marginal product. 
(16) A Aw P A     
  
(17) 
1 1 2Y Y
Y
Y
w H L x A
H






A competitive human capital market implies that 
H Aw w which further determines PA as well as the 






   

  












     
  
   









     
  
The growth rate of technology is therefore given by 
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Notice that PA under trade, equation (18), versus PA 
under autarky, equation (11) differs by a factor of 2.  
In other words, trade has doubled the relative price of 
patents, which has raised the return to investing in 
human capital, just as Rivera-Batiz and Romer 
[1991] predict.  The difference between them and us 
manifests itself in the analytic solution for the growth 
rate of technology, g. Compare equations (21) and 
(12). Rivera-Batiz and Romer’s [1991] solution for g 
as a result of trade in goods is analytically identical to 
the solution for g under autarky (equation (12)) such 
that they conclude that trade in goods has no growth 
effects.  
 
Note the intuitive difference.  In Rivera-Batiz and 
Romer [1991], upon opening trade in goods, one 
country, say H, goes first by introducing an 
innovation.  In exactly half the time its takes H to 
invent a still newer innovation, F introduces its latest 
innovation.  The two countries now proceed to take 
turns introducing new goods.  The proprietary firm of 
each new innovation may capitalize on both home 
and foreign demands but only for half the time that it 
did so under autarky. 
 
Here, upon opening trade in goods, both countries 
simultaneously introduce their respective versions of 
the newest innovation.  Since the two versions, 
foreign and domestic, are perfect substitutes, they 
must share the market thereby creating a duopoly 
where the intermediate producers are Cournot-Nash 
competitors.5   
 
Trade in ideas as well as in intermediate goods is 
specified exactly as above except that the technology 
constraint, equation (15), and the zero profit 
condition, equation (13), must be altered to reflect 
trade in ideas. 
(22)  FAA H A A   0    
  
(23)   0FA Aj A Aj jP H A A w H       
  
Trade in ideas implies that the change in technology, 
A , is a result of the world stock of technology 
combined with domestic human capital effort.  
Output of the individual R&D firm j also must reflect 
trade in ideas such that  Fj AjA H A A  .  The 







   

  
    
  
(25) 







     
  
  




















   
  
IV. Comparisons 
Table 1 presents the results from (1) autarky, (2) 
trade in intermediate goods only, (3) trade in goods 
as well as ideas, and (4) Rivera-Batiz and Romer’s 
[1991] trade in goods as well as ideas.  Notice that 
the growth rate of technology, g*, is a strictly a 
function of coefficients and the stock of human 
capital, H. Given their analytic solutions, it must be 
that g*2<g*1, 
1 3* *g g , 2 3* *g g , and 
3 4* *g g , which implies that 
4 3 1 2* * * *g g g g    as well as 
4 3 1 2* * * *r r r r   .6 
 
Next consider the output of the intermediate good, xi, 
and the price of technology, PA, across the three 
cases.  Technical Appendix 1 clearly shows that 
4 3 1 2* * * *i i i ix x x x    and 
4 3 1 2* * * *A A A AP P P P   .  
 
Figures I and II present a graphical representation of 
these results.  Notice that from Table I the demand 
for the intermediate goods, xi, as well as the price of 
technology, PA, depend solely on the human capital 
in final goods production, HY. 
 
Finally consider the human capital allocations in 
cases 1, 2, 3, and 4.  Recall that for cases 1 and 2, 
* *Ag H .  Therefore if g*
1>g*2, then 
1 2* *A AH H and 
1 2* *Y YH H . Intuitively, 
pro-competitive gains from trade implies higher 
production of intermediate goods, xi , which 
necessarily raises the marginal product on human 
capital in final production.  Simultaneously, the 
marginal product of human capital in research falls 
with the lower expectation of future monopoly 
profits.  Thus it follows that there should be relatively 
less human capital effort in research (and more in 
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final goods production) with trade in goods than in 
autarky. 
 
When trade in ideas is allowed in addition to trade in 
goods, the growth rate of technology increases 
relative to autarky, i.e. 
1 3* *g g .  Notice that 
from Table 1, the analytic solutions for the optimal 
work effort, HA*, HY*, and consequently, the interest 
rate are identical for case 1 and case 3.  Therefore, if 
1 3* *r r , then 1 3* *Y YH H  and 
1 3* *A AH H . Technical Appendix 2 shows that 
2 3* *A AH H  and 
2 3* *Y YH H  as well as 
1 4* *A AH H  and 
1 4* *Y YH H . Summing up 
the results, we may conclude that 
4 1 3 2* * * *A A A AH H H H   .  Figure III 
presents a graphical representation of these results. 
 
V. Conclusion 
The results herein are complementary to those found 
in Rivera-Batiz and Romer [1991].  The general 
results from that paper as well as the limitations 
placed on those results by the authors still hold here.  
They are that economic integration, when the change 
in technology is subject to increasing returns, has a 
positive long run effect on economic growth.  And 
given the nature of the exponential growth function, 
policies that affect trade necessarily affect growth 
and can have large cumulative effects on economic 
welfare.  Furthermore, the two models ultimately 
characterize different sets of stylised facts that we 
observe in the world.  There certainly does exist the 
ability to innovate and reap the returns across the 
entire world (i.e. Microsoft).  But there also exists the 
stylised fact that countries do produce their own 
versions of goods without the explicit exchange of 
ideas (i.e. automobile industry). 
  
The two different model specifications each have 
analytic strengths as well as weaknesses.  The main 
weakness of Rivera-Batiz and Romer [1991] is the 
stepwise nature of trade where each country takes 
turns innovating.  The main weakness here is that 
without trade in ideas, each country still comes up 
independently with identical innovations.  The main 
strength of Rivera-Batiz and Romer [1991] is that 
worldwide monopoly rents are available to 
innovators.  The main strength here is the pro-
competitive gains from trade from imperfect 
competition result in the dynamic setting.  
 
This paper adds to the literature in four ways. First, it 
provides an alternative specification to a widely cited 
piece of literature, Rivera-Batiz and Romer [1991].  
Second, it demonstrates the relevance of standard 
trade theory on imperfect competition in the context 
of dynamic models of technological change.  In so 
doing, we highlight the pro-competitive gains from 
trade available as a result of imperfect competition in 
one of the sectors and show the negative growth 
effects of disallowing trade in ideas.  Third, the paper 
shows that the growth benefits from increased 
integration (i.e. trade in ideas) outweigh the negative 
growth effects of the pro-competitive gains. Forth, it 
opens an interesting avenue of research into the other 
parallels that must exist between trade and new 
growth theory.  In other words, one may now 
consider in the above framework, any number of 
extensions from differentiated countries to tax effects 
to the consideration of different manners of 




Technical Appendix 1 – Comparison of Intermediate Good, xi and the price of technology, PA, across cases 
 
  Show that 

































   .  Given that 1-2 1

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(note: The analytic solutions to r*1 and r*2 imply that 
1 2
1 2* ** *
2











H   ) 
 
It must be that 
1 2* *i ix x and given the analytic solution to PA , it must also be that 
1 2* *A AP P . chk. 
 
  Show that 
1 3* *i ix x :  
 
The comparison of 
1 3*  . *i ix vs x  may be simplified to 
1 3*  . *Y YH vs H , whose solution we already know to be 
that 
1 3* *Y YH H  which implies that 
1 3* *i ix x  and 
1 3* *A AP P . chk.  
 
  Show that 
2 3

































  .  Given that 1-2 1










 (note: The analytic solutions to r*2 and r*3 imply that 
3 2
3 2* ** *
2











H   ) 
 
It must be that 
2 3
* *i ix x and given the analytic solution to PA , it must also be that 
2 3* *A AP P . chk. 
 
  Show that 
4 3




i ix x . From the analytic solutions to xi , the assumption implies that  
   
1 1
4 32 * < *Y YH H
  
 or 
4 31-2 2 * *Y YH H










  . 
Given that 1-2 1








H  . 
 
(note: The analytic solutions to r*4 and r*3 imply that 
4 3













H  . ) 
 
It must be that 
4 3
* *i ix x and given the analytic solution to PA , it must also be that 
4 3* *A AP P . chk. 
 
Economic Integration and Endogenous Growth Revisited: Pro-Competitive Gains from Trade in Goods and the Long 
Run Benefits to the Exchange of Ideas 
Professionals Center for Business Research Page 11 
 
 
Technical Appendix 2 – Comparisons of Human capital across cases 
 
 Show that 
2 3* *Y YH H and 




Y YH H and 
2 3
A AH H .    
 
2 3
A AH H , given that 
22
Ag H and 
33 2 Ag H , implies that 
2 32g g . 
 


























H H   
 




 or simply that 2    . 
 
It must be that 
2 3* *Y YH H  and 
2 3* *A AH H . chk. 
 
 Show that 
1 4* *Y YH H and 




Y YH H and 
1 4
A AH H . 
 
1 4
A AH H , given that 
11
Ag H and 
44 2 Ag H , implies that 
1 42g g . 
 























H H   
 
    
 
    
 or simply that 2 1   . 
 
It must be that 
1 4* *Y YH H  and 
1 4* *A AH H . chk. 
 
Technical Appendix 3 – Case 1: No Trade 
 
Consider two identical economies in autarky defined as follows: 
 

























Y H L x di    

   
Capital Formation:   t tK Y C   
Technological Change:  AA H A  
Total human capital:   
A YH H H   
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   
      where 
  1





























     






Technical Appendix 4 – Case 2: Trade Only In Intermediate Goods 
 
Consider trade only in intermediate goods, 










   
(note that there are A different intermediate goods per country) 
 
2 identical countries 
F
A A   
 
There is NO trade in ideas  
AA H A  
 
The human capital market in each country is competitive  A Yw w  
 
A Aw P A   
1 1 2Y Y
Y
Y
w H L x A
H






(note: The price of A is determined by the horizontal summation of the demand for xi in each country.  The fact that 
the market for xi is twice as big in free trade versus autarky is captured endogenously in the price of A) 
 
A Yw w  
 
1 1 2A YP A H L x A
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            
 
   
          
 
 












     
  
  
    
 
 * * *A Y
A
g H H H
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 
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   
 
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Technical Appendix 5 – Case 3: Trade In Intermediate Goods + Trade In Ideas 
 










   
 
2 identical countries 
F
A A   
 
Trade in ideas   FAA H A A   
 
The human capital market in each country is competitive  A Yw w  
 
 FA Aw P A A    
1 1 2Y Y
Y
Y
w H L x A
H






A Yw w  
 
1 12 2A YP A H L x A
























H L x A
r
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Case 1 vs. 2 vs. 3 vs. 4 
 
1. Autarky = Rivera-Batiz & Romer [1991] 
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3. Trade in Intermediaries + Trade in Ideas 
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4. Rivera-Batiz & Romer [1991]: Trade in Intermediaries + Trade in Ideas 
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Intermediate Goods Market 
Cases 1 vs. 2 
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Figure II 
Intermediate Goods Market 
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Figure III 
Human Capital Market  
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1 For example, Aghion and Howitt [1998] in their advanced text, Endogenous Growth Theory, present 
the incorrect Romer and River-Batiz [1991] results as part of the chapter, “Growth in Open 
Economies.” [Aghion and Howitt, 1998, p. 374] 
2 See Markusen, et. al. [1995], International Trade: Theory and Evidence, McGraw Hill, ch. 11, or any 
other good intermediate trade textbook for an exposition on imperfect competition and trade. 
3 This is the point where we diverge analytically from Rivera-Batiz and Romer [1991].  They assume 
that trade in goods implies that 2H Aw P A  (see Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991, p. 543-4).   We 
simply allow PA to adjust endogenously to the new market conditions. 
4 Although this is not explicitly stated with in Rivera-Batiz and Romer [1991], it is certainly the case if 
countries can not produce redundant goods after they are allowed to trade. 
5 There is no need to consider Bertrand competition here because it would necessarily result marginal 
cost pricing and zero profits to intermediate producers.  This effectively removes any incentive to 
conduct research such that 0AH  and 0A K  .  In other words, if technological change is the 
engine of growth and without monopoly profits to provide the incentive to research, then there is no 
research and, as a consequence, no growth.  Interestingly enough, the Bertrand version also implies that 
the two countries are not only identical but also characterised by perfect competition and constant 
return to scale in its tradable goods, which is the standard “no trade” model. 
6 This result is derived from the Euler Equation,  
1
* *g r 

  . 
 
